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Abstract. Threshold models and their dynamics may be used to model
the spread of ‘behaviors’ in social networks. Regarding such from a modal
logical perspective, it is shown how standard update mechanisms may be
emulated using action models – graphs encoding agents’ decision rules. A
small class of action models capturing the possible sets of decision rules
suitable for threshold models is identified, and shown to include models
characterizing best-response dynamics of both coordination and anti-
coordination games played on graphs. We conclude with further aspects
of the action model approach to threshold dynamics, including broader
applicability and logical aspects. Hereby, new links between social net-
work theory, game theory and dynamic ‘epistemic’ logic are drawn.
An individual’s choice of phone, language use or convictions may be influenced by
the people around her [12,22,23]. How a new trend spreads through a population
depends on how agents are influenced by others, which in turn depends on the
structure of the population and on how easy agents are to influence.
This paper focuses on one particular account of social influence, the no-
tion of ‘threshold influence’ [15]. Threshold influence relies on a simple imita-
tion or conformity pressure effect: agents adopt a behavior/fashion/semantics
whenever some given threshold of their social network neighbors have adopted
it already. So-called threshold models, introduced by [11,19], represent diffusion
dynamics under threshold influence. Threshold models have received much atten-
tion in recent literature [10,14,16,21], also from authors in the logic community
[1,6,7,15,18,20,24].
Fig. 1. (Definitions below): A threshold model with 5 agents, threshold θ = 1
4
, and
behavior B marked by gray. Top: agents change behavior in accordance with equation
(1) and the dynamics reach a fixed point. Bottom: agents update according to equation
(2). Here, the dynamics loop.
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In this paper, a novel approach to threshold models is taken by constructing
the dynamics using action models and product update [3,4,9]. In this context,
an action model may be regarded as a graph that encodes decision rules. The
product of a threshold model and an action model is again a threshold model,
but where each agent has now updated their behavior according to the encoded
decision rules.
The paper progresses as follows. First, threshold models and two typical up-
date rules are introduced. We then introduce a modal language interpreted over
threshold models, along with action models and product update. We produce an
action model for each of the two introduced update rules, and show the step-
wise equivalence of the two approaches. These two action models gives rise to
a small class of action models, which is investigated in relation to tie-breaking
rules, coordination game and anti-coordination game best-response dynamics.
We conclude with a discussion of further aspects of the action model approach
to threshold dynamics, including broader applicability and logical aspects.
The motivation for the work is primarily technical. The author found it in-
teresting that threshold dynamics could so straightforwardly be encoded using
action models. There is however an interesting conceptual twist: action models
are not interpreted as being informational events, but as encoding decision rules
of agents. Hence, the class arising from the action model encoding best-responses
in coordination games may be seen as containing all possible sets of decision rules
compatible with agents acting under the used notion of threshold influence. The
class contains variations of tie-breaking rules, and shows a neat symmetry: for
each “coordination game action model”, the class contains a “dual” version for
anti-coordination games. From a logical perspective, this class is interesting as
each arising dynamics may be treated in a uniform manner, using the reduction
axiom method well-known from dynamic epistemic logic [3,8].
1 Threshold Models and their Dynamics
Threshold Models. A threshold model includes a network N of agents A
and a behavior B (or fashion, or product, or viral video) distributed over the
agents. As such, it represents the current spread of B through the network. An
adoption threshold prescribes how the state will evolve: agents adopt B when the
proportion of their neighbors who have already adopted it meets the threshold.
Formally, a threshold model is a tupleM = (A, N,B, θ) where A is a finite set
of agents, N ⊆ A×A a irreflexive and symmetric network, B ⊆ A a behavior,
and θ ∈ [0, 1] the adoption threshold.1 For an agent a ∈ A, her neighborhood is
N(a) := {b : (a, b) ∈ N}.
Threshold Model Dynamics. Threshold models are used to investigate the
spread of a behavior over discrete time-steps t0, t1, ..., i.e., the dynamics of the
1 The literature contains several variations, including infinite networks [16], non-
inflating behavior [16], agent-specific thresholds, non-symmetric relations, weighted
links [14], and multiple behaviors [1].
behavior. Given an initial threshold model for t0, M = (A, N,B0, θ), several
update policies for the behavior set B0 exists.2 One popular such [7,10,14] is
captured by (1):
Bn+1 = Bn ∪
{
a :
|N(a) ∩Bn|
|N(a)| ≥ θ
}
. (1)
I.e., a plays (adopts, follows) B at tn+1 iff a plays B at tn, or a proportion of
a’s neighbors larger or equal to the threshold plays B at tn.
The former disjunct makes B increase over time, i.e., ∀n : Bn ⊆ Bn+1. This
guarantees that (1) reaches a fixed point. The ‘or equal to’ embeds a tie-breaking
rule favoring B.
Inflation may be dropped and the tie-breaking rule changed by using e.g. the
policy specified by (2) instead:
Bn+1 =
{
a : |N(a)∩Bn||N(a)| > θ
}
∪
{
a : |N(a)∩Bn||N(a)| = θ and a ∈ Bn
}
. (2)
The second set in the union invokes a conservative tie-breaking rule: if |N(a)∩Bn||N(a)| =
θ, a will continue her behavior from tn. That (2) does not cause B to inflate im-
plies the possibility of loops in behavior, i.e. where Bn = Bn+2 6= Bn+1. Thereby
(2) does not necessarily reach a fixed point.
Threshold Model Dynamics as Induced by Game Play. Threshold in-
fluence may naturally be seen as an instance of a coordination problem: given
enough of an agent’s neighbors adopt behavior B, the agent will seek to coordi-
nate with that group by adopting B herself. This coordination problem may be
modeled as a coordination game
B ¬B
B x, x 0, 0
¬B 0, 0 y, y
played on the network: at each time-step, each agent chooses one strategy from
{B,¬B} and plays this strategy against all their neighbors simultaneously. Agent
a’s payoff tn is then the sum of the payoffs of the |N(a)| coordination games that
a plays at time tn. With these rules, B is a best-response for agent a at time tn
iff
x · |N(a)∩Bn||N(a)| ≥ y · |N(a)∩¬Bn||N(a)| ⇔ |N(a)∩Bn||N(a)| ≥
y
x+ y
. (3)
Setting θ := yx+y , the right-hand side of (3) resembles the specifications from (1)
and (2). The precise correlation is that (2) captures the best-response dynamics
for coordination game play on networks when using conservative tie-breaking
[16], while (1) captures the same with tie-breaking biased towards B and the
added assumption of a (possibly irrational) ‘seed’ of agents always playing B
[10].
2 Attention is here restricted to deterministic, discrete time simultaneous updates. See
e.g. [17] for stochastic processes.
2 Threshold Models, Kripke Models and Action Models
A threshold model gives rise to a Kripke model [5] with A as domain, N as
relation and a valuation ‖ · ‖ : Φ −→ P(A), Φ := {B}, determining the extension
of the B playing agents. To describe features of agents’ neighborhoods, we use
a language L with suitable threshold modalities:
> | B | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈≤〉ϕ | [≤]ϕ | (=)ϕ
The three operators could be parametrized by θ, but to lighten notation, we
leave the threshold implicit.
Intuitively, if a satisfies 〈≤〉ϕ, then there exists a θ ‘large enough’ set of
a’s neighbors that satisfy ϕ. E.g., if ϕ := B, then at least a θ fraction of a’s
neighbors satisfy B. According to (1), a should then change his behavior to B.
The operator is inspired by [2,13] and exemplified in Fig. 2. [≤] is the universal
‘box’ to the existential ‘diamond’ 〈≤〉: if a satisfies [≤]ϕ, then all neighbors in
all θ ‘large enough’ subsets of a’s neighborhood satisfy ϕ. Finally, (=)ϕ captures
that exactly a θ fraction of the agent’s neighbors satisfy ϕ. In particular, if a
satisfies (=)B, then a should invoke a tie-breaking rule.
With threshold θ, satisfaction inM is given by standard Boolean clauses and
the following:
M, a |= B iff a ∈ ‖B‖
M, a |= 〈≤〉ϕ iff ∃C : θ ≤ |C∩N(a)||N(a) and ∀a ∈ C,M, a |= ϕ
M, a |= [≤]ϕ iff ∀C : θ ≤ |C∩N(a)||N(a) implies ∀a ∈ C,M, a |= ϕ
M, a |= (=)ϕ iff θ = N(a)∩‖ϕ‖M|N(a)| .
The extension of ϕ inM is denoted ‖ϕ‖M := {a ∈ A :M, a |= ϕ}.
Fig. 2. A threshold modelM with θ = 1
4
and B marked by gray. b satisfies 〈≤〉B, as
M, a |= B and |{a}||{a,b,c}| ≥ 14 . Agent e satisfies [≤]¬B as ∀C ⊆ N(e) : |C∩N(e)||N(e)| ≥ θ (that
is, for sets {c}, {d}, {c, d}), C ⊆ ‖¬B‖M. Moreover, agent a satisfies ¬(=)B ∧ [≤]¬B –
hence, according to (2), she then should start playing ¬B, whereas (1) will not allow
her to change.
From 〈≤〉, [≤] and (=), we define strict versions of the two former. These are
useful when encoding non-biased tie-breaking rules:
〈<〉ϕ : = 〈≤〉ϕ ∧ ¬(=)ϕ
[<]ϕ : = [≤]ϕ ∧ ¬(=)ϕ
Two comments on the threshold operators are due. First, the operators do
not form the basis of a normal modal logic: (=) distributes over neither ∨ nor ∧,
and the ‘diamond’ 〈≤〉 does not distribute over ∨.3 The ‘box’ [≤] does validate
K: [≤](ϕ → ψ) → ([≤]ϕ → [≤]ψ) and thus distributes over ∧, but it is not
the dual of 〈≤〉, i.e., [≤]ϕ ↔ ¬〈≤〉¬ϕ is not valid.4 If |A| > 1, the right-to-left
direction holds, but not vice versa. Second, (=)ϕ does not imply that (=)¬ϕ, as
the semantics are given w.r.t. θ. (=)ϕ does imply that N(a)∩‖¬ϕ‖M|N(a)| = 1− θ. This
point is important as onlyM, a |= (=)B, and notM, a |= (=)¬B, means that a
must invoke a tie-breaking rule.
Action Models and Product Update. Rather than updating threshold mod-
els by analyzing best responses or consulting equations like (1) or (2), they may
be updated by taking the graph-theoretical product with a graph that encodes
decision rules, uniformly followed by all agents. Such graphs are known as action
models (with postconditions) [3,4,9]. To illustrate, then (cf. Proposition 1 below)
E1 captures the same dynamics as those invoked by (1):
In the current context, it is natural to interpret each state of an action models as
a decision rule.5 E.g., σ1 encodes the rule ‘if a θ fraction or more of your neighbors
play B, then play B’. State σ2 encodes that if the agent is not influenced to play
B, she should continue her current behavior.
Formally, by an action model we here refer to a tuple E = (|E|, R, cond)
where |E| is a non-empty domain of states, R ⊆ |E| × |E| is a relation on |E|,
and cond a pre- and postcondition map cond : |E| −→ L × {B,¬B,>} with
cond(σ) = (ϕ,ψ) =: (pre(σ), post(σ)).
The product update [3,9] of threshold model M and action model E is the
threshold modelM⊗E = (A↑, N↑, B↑, θ) with θ fromM, and
A↑ = {(a, σ) ∈ A× |E| :M, a |= pre(σ)},
N↑ 3 ((a, σ), (b, σ′)) iff (a, b) ∈ N and (σ, σ′) ∈ R, and
B↑= {(s, σ) :s∈B ∧ post(σ) 6=¬B}∪{(s, σ) :post(σ)=B}.
By the last condition, B↑ consists of 1) the agents in B minus those who change
to ¬B, plus 2) the agents that change to B. Hence every agent will after the
update again only play one strategy. If post(σ) = >, no change in behavior is
invoked.
3 The latter was pointed out by Prof. A. Baltag for a similar operator in [2].
4 The dual of [≤] would have the universal quantifier in the semantic clause of 〈≤〉ϕ
replaced by an existential one.
5 The relation between actions is merely a technicality and is not given an interpre-
tation. Given a re-defined product operation that ignores the relation of the action
model, it could from both a conceptual and technical point be omitted.
3 Action Model Dynamics
Considering threshold models as Kripke models, it is possible to construct action
models that when applied using product update will produce model sequences
step-wise equivalent to those produced by (1) and (2). Moreover, the used models
(in particular E2 below) gives rise to a simple class of action models. This class,
specified below, contains all natural variations of the decision rules emulating (1)
and (2). Thus, the class specifies all the different sets of decision rules by which
agents may update their behavior while still behaving in the spirit of present
notion of threshold influence.
Proposition 1. For any threshold modelM, the action model E1 applied using
product update produces model sequences step-wise equivalent to those of (1).
Proof. Let M = (A, N,B, θ) be arbitrary with (1)-update (A, N,B+, θ) and
E1-update (A↑, N↑, B↑, θ). Then f :a 7→ (a, σ), σ ∈ {σ1, σ2} is an isomorphism
from (A, N,B+) to (A↑, N↑, B↑). 1) |A| = |A↑|, as the preconditions of E1 par-
titions A entailing that no agents multiply or die under product update. 2)
((a, σ), (b, σ′)) ∈ N↑ iff (a, b) ∈ N : R from E1 is the full relation, so N dictates
N↑. 3) f(B+) = B↑ as
a ∈ B+ iff
|N(a)∩B|
|N(a)| ≥ θ iff
∃C ⊆ N(a) ∩B : |C||N(a)| ≥ θ iff
M, a |= 〈≤〉B iff
M, a |= pre(σ1) iff
M⊗E1, (a, σ1) |= B iff f(a) ∈ B↑ uunionsq
The action model E1 contains only two states as (1) invokes a biased tie-
breaking rule, subsumed in the state σ1 by using the non-strict 〈≤〉B in the
precondition. (2), in contrast, invokes a conservative, unbiased tie-breaking rule.
This requires an extra state to encode:
Interpreted as decision rules, σ1 of E2 states that if strictly more than a θ fraction
of an agent a’s neighbors plays B, then a should do the same; σ2 embodies the
conservative tie-breaking rule: if exactly a θ fraction of a’s neighbors play B
(and hence a (1− θ) fraction plays ¬B), then a should not change her behavior;
finally, for σ3, notice that if [<]¬B, i.e., that all θ ‘strictly large enough’ subsets
of a’s neighbors plays ¬B, then there is a strictly larger than (1− θ) fraction of
her neighbors that play ¬B—σ3 states that in that case, a should also play ¬B.
Proposition 2. For any threshold modelM, The action model E2 applied using
product update produces model sequences step-wise equivalent to those of (2).
Proof. Analogous to those of Propositions 1 and 3 (see below). uunionsq
The Class of Threshold Model Update Action Models. For the reasons
mentioned in the proof of Proposition 1, for an action model to change neither
agent set nor network when applied to an arbitrary threshold model, it must be
fully connected and it’s preconditions must form a partition on the agent set. If
one further accepts only preconditions that are in the spirit of standard threshold
model updates, i.e., that agents change behavior based only on the behavior
of their immediate neighbors, then the class of ‘threshold model update action
models’ is easy to map. For by the latter restriction, 〈<〉B, (=)B and [>]¬B form
the unique finest partition6 on the agent set of any threshold model. Given the
three possible postconditions B,> and ¬B, the class of suitable action models
contains 27 models (Table 1).
pre: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
σ1: 〈<〉B B B B B B B B B B
σ2: (=)B B B B > > > ¬B ¬B ¬B
σ3: [>]¬B B > ¬B B > ¬B B > ¬B
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
σ1: 〈<〉B > > > > > > > > >
σ2: (=)B B B B > > > ¬B ¬B ¬B
σ3: [>]¬B B > ¬B B > ¬B B > ¬B
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
σ1: 〈<〉B ¬B ¬B ¬B ¬B ¬B ¬B ¬B ¬B ¬B
σ2: (=)B B B B > > > ¬B ¬B ¬B
σ3: [>]¬B B > ¬B B > ¬B B > ¬B
Table 1. Each action model contains three states with preconditions specified by pre
and postconditions by columns 1 to 27.
As mention, this class of action models may be seen as containing all the pos-
sible sets of decision rules compatible with the used notion of threshold influence.
Using action models it is a simple, combinatorial task to map. This is a benefit
of using action models to define dynamics over the set theoretic specification.
6 The symmetric variant 〈<〉¬B, (=)¬B and [>]B is ignored as it is equivalent up to
interchange of B and ¬B.
Dynamics Induced by Action Models. Note that the action model E1 is
not explicitly listed in Table 1. It is not so as E1 is based on a coarser partition
of the agent set, containing two rather than three cells. It is however equivalent
to the listed model 2: simply collapse states σ1 and σ2 to one.
The class include three trivial dynamics induced by models 1, 14 and 27 and
seven that make little sense (4, 7, 8, 16, 17 and 24).
The best-response dynamics of coordination games are emulated by mod-
els 3, 6 and 9, capturing discriminating (3,9) and conservative (6) tie-breaking
(cf. Proposition 2), while models 2, 5, 15 and 18 capture inflating (‘seeded’)
coordination game dynamics.
Proposition 3 below lends credences to the conjecture that models 19, 22
and 25 capture the best-response dynamics for anti-coordination games with
discriminating (19,25) and conservative (22) tie-breaking, and that 10, 13, 23
and 26 capture inflating dynamics of anti-coordination games.
Proposition 3. For any threshold model, the best-response dynamics of the
anti-coordination game
B ¬B
B 0, 0 y, x
¬B x, y 0, 0
played with the conservative tie-breaking rule is step-wise equivalent to applying
the action model 22 (E22) from Table 1 with θ = xy+x .
Proof. LetM = (A, N,B, θ). Playing B is a best-response inM for agent a iff
y · |N(a)∩¬B||N(a)| ≥ x · |N(a)∩B||N(a)| ⇔ |N(a)∩¬B||N(a)| ≥ xy+x = θ
Hence, given the tie-breaking rule, the next set of B-players will be
B+ = {a : |N(a)∩¬B||N(a)| > θ} ∪ {a : |N(a)∩¬B||N(a)| = θ and a ∈ B}.
LetM⊗E22 = (A↑, N↑, B↑n, θ). Then g : a 7→ (a, σ), σ ∈ |E22|, is an isomor-
phism from (A, N,B+) to (A↑, N↑, B↑n). That (A, N) ∼=g (A↑, N↑) follows from
the proof of Proposition 1.
a ∈ B+ iff
|N(a)∩¬B|
|N(a)| > θ or
|N(a)∩¬B|
|N(a)| = θ and a ∈ B iff
M, a |= 〈<〉¬B or M, a |= B ∧ (=)¬B iff
M, a |= pre(σ1) or M, a |= B ∧ pre(σ2) iff
M⊗E22, (a, σ1) |= B
(as post(σ1) = B)
or M⊗E22, (a, σ2) |= B
(as post(σ2) = >)
iff g(a) ∈ B↑ uunionsq
Logics for Threshold Dynamics. Given the uniform, action model approach
to the dynamics outlined, it may be conjectured that the dynamics may also be
treated by a uniform logical approach, particularly the reduction axiom method
well-known from dynamic epistemic logic [3,8].
Three things are required to obtain a complete logic for one of the dynamics:
1. A complete axiomatization for the threshold operators 〈≤〉, [≤] and (=),
2. A complete axiomatization of the network properties, and
3. Reduction laws for the used action model.
For 1, one may search for results in the literature on probabilistic modal logic.
No suitable, general result is known to the author. 2 is easily obtained, though
it requires a richer language, extending L with a normal modal operator ♦ and
hybrid logical nominals {i, j, ...}. The latter is required to express the irreflexivity
of the network relation, characterized by i→ ¬♦i. To complete a combined logic,
interaction axioms for the thresholds operators and normal modal operators
should also be added. A reduction axiom-based logic for action models with
post-conditions already exists (the logic UM from [9]), but the system should
be modified to suit the hybrid nominals and threshold modalities. If such a
combined logic is obtained for one of the dynamics, one will automatically obtain
complete logics for all of the 27 dynamics induced by the action models of Table
1, with the only variation between them being the used action model in the
dynamic modalities.
4 An Action Model for ‘Belief Change in the Community’
One reviewer asked whether there is a relation between the action model ap-
proach used here, and the finite state automata approach introduced in [24] for
threshold influence dynamics of preferences, and in particular, whether a trans-
lation between the two approaches exist. We conjecture that this is indeed the
case. To lend credence to this conjecture, we show this may be done for the
slightly simpler framework of threshold influence of belief change from [15].
The basic framework of [15] investigates the dynamics of strong and weak
influence of beliefs among agents in a symmetric and irreflexive network. Beliefs
are represented by three mutually exclusive atoms Bp,B¬p and Up, evaluated
at agents in the network, as above. M, a |= Bp reads ‘a believes p’, and being
undecided about p, Up, is equivalent to ¬Bp ∧ ¬B¬p. To describe the network,
a normal box operator F is used: M, a |= Fϕ iff ∀b ∈ N(a),M, b |= ϕ. F has
dual 〈F 〉 – 〈F 〉ϕ reads ‘I have a friend that satisfies ϕ’. Call the language L′.
An agent is strongly influence to believe ϕ ∈ {p,¬p} if all her friends believe
ϕ, and weakly influenced to believe ϕ if no friends believe ¬ϕ while at least one
friend believes ϕ. With
Sϕ := FBϕ ∧ 〈F 〉Bϕ and
Wϕ := F¬B¬ϕ ∧ 〈F 〉Bϕ,
the dynamics of strong and weak influence are then characterized by the finite
state automaton in Fig. 3, applied to all agents simultaneously.
Fig. 3. The automaton of [15], which characterizes agents’ belief change under weak
and strong influence. If an agent is undecided about p, i.e., in the state Up, and is
strongly influenced to believe p, Sp, she will change to state Bp, i.e., believe p. The
automaton is deterministic.
Given this setup, it is no hard task to construct an action model over L′ that
will invoke the same dynamics. This may be done systematically by the con-
struction: 1) for each state-transition-state triple (s, t, s′) from the automaton,
construct an action model state σ with the conjunction of the labels of s and t
as precondition, and the label from s′ as postcondition, and 2) let the relation of
the action model be the full relation. The resulting action model I is depicted in
Fig. 4. It is easy to verify that the effects of the two approaches are equivalent.
Fig. 4. The action model I, invoking the same dynamics as the automaton of Fig. 3
(some edges are omitted). The top-most state makes an agent change from state Up
to state B¬p if the agents also is strongly influenced to believe ¬p, etc.
The construction method used defines a function from automata to action mod-
els. If one restricts attention to action models with preconditions of the form
(ϕ∧ψ), a function from action models to automata may be defined by the con-
struction: 1) for each action model state σ, cond(σ) = ((ϕ ∧ ψ), χ), construct a
automaton state with label ϕ and one with label χ, and collapse all automata
states with equivalent labels, and 2) for each all automaton states with labels ϕ
and χ, add a transition with label ψ between them if there exists an action model
state with cond(σ) = ((ϕ ∧ ψ), χ). Combining the two constructions provides a
bijection, serving as translation.
A Logic for Belief Change in the Community. Given that it is possible
to emulate the dynamics invoked by the finite state automaton using an action
model, finding a sound and complete logic for the dynamics should be unprob-
lematic. In fact, as F is a normal modal operator, the case is simpler than for
threshold dynamics. Again some hybrid machinery is required to capture the
irreflexive frame condition, but if this requirement is dropped, the reduction
axiom system from [9] provides the desired result.
5 Closing Remarks
It has been argued that action models may be used to emulate the best-response
dynamics on coordination and anti-coordination games played on networks by
showing the product updates equivalent to the threshold model dynamics in-
duced by game play, and that the method is applicable to the framework of
threshold influence from [15]. It is conjectured that the action model approach
to threshold dynamics lightens the work of finding complete logics, using meth-
ods well-known from dynamic epistemic logic, hereby providing new connections
between game theory, social network theory and dynamic ‘epistemic’ logic.
Two questions present themselves. First, is it possible to rationalize the seven
unaccounted for action models in the identified class, by moving from action
models to game playing situations? Second, what is the extent of the applicability
of action models? The present paper utilizes only a fraction of the potential of
action models, as such may also be used to systematically alter the agent set and
network. Changing the agent set may be used to model agent death and birth,
whereby deterministic SIRS-like epidemiological dynamics [17] may be captured.
Alterations to the social network may be used to model e.g. rise in popularity
of information sources.
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